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It is important to note that the Illinois DREAM Act<J should not be confused with the federal DREAM Act; 10 despite the similarity in title, these two pieces of legislation arc, in bet, quite ditkrcnt. The (I) Have resided with his or her parents or guardian while attending a public or private high school in I Illinois I· ( 2) Have graduated tl-om a public or private high school or received the equivalent of ~l high school diploma in j Illinois I· ( 3) Ha\T attended school in I Illinois I f(>r at least 3 wars ~1s of the date he or she graduated tl-om high school or received the equivalent of a high school diploma.
( 4) H~we at least one parent who immigr~lted to the United States. IX 
177
These requirements create a classification based on national origin, violating the Equal Protection Clause, and, accordingly, must bee strict scrutiny. 1 9 The strict scrutiny test requires that a compelling government interest be served and that the means of achieving th~lt interest be narrowly tailored to the compelling interest. 20 This statute hils to serve ~l compelling government interest and is not narrowly tailored even if such an interest did exist. for conf1icting with the fourteenth Amendment, this portion of the Act must be immediately innlidatcd fix being unconstitutional. 2! This Note will analyze the conf1ict between Illinois Compiled Statute Chapter 110, Act 947, Section 67-thc portion of the lllinois DREAM Act creating a scholarship-~md b~1sic principles stated in the fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Part I consists of a brief overview of the Equal Protection Clause and its general applicability. Part II addresses how the Act meets the state action requirements needed f(>r an equal protection atulysis. This is done by establishing the appropriate standard of review f(>r this type of constihttional violation and addressing the classification created, the government's interest in this legislation, and how tailored the actions of the legislative body arc in achieving their interest. following the Part II analysis, the Conclusion will discuss the problems created by this legislation and how this analysis will afkct legislation in other jurisdictions, as well as provide a suggested remedy of how the sponsors and co-sponsors of this bill could establish the proposed scholarship in a way that docs not violate the Constitution.
II. EQUAL PROTECJ"ION ANALYSIS
The Equal Protection Clause is fi:nmd in section one of the fourteenth Amendment and states that "In ]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " 22 Historically, this allowed f()r separate treatment along class lines as long as it was cqual, 23 until Brown v. Hoard of" bduc:ztion was decided, overruling the separate but equal ideology and paving the way f(:>r the current equal protection analysis. 2 4 The current analysis is such that there must be some f(mn of state action 2 5 seeking to achieve a goal, by which a classification amongst its people is created. A subsequent analysis is then done to address the groups being classified to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the classification.
A. State Action
The fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to st~ltc action, not "merely private conduct. "2 6 When "cnf(xccmcnt of a statute, on its t:Kc, I is I racially discriminatory," 27 "compliance with a statute I commands I a private entity to discriminatc,"2il or an "agent of the state" acts discrimin~uorily, Once state action has been established, an analysis of the basis of the cbssification becomes necessary to determine ~onstitutionalitv. 34 The process begins by identifying. the source of the classiticatio;1. 35 These classifications can be manifest in one of three wavs: ( l) Through a hcially discriminatory statute or policy; 3 6 (2) Through a t:Kially neutral, but administratively discriminatory statute; 3 7 or ( 3) Through a f~Ki~1lly and administratively neutral statute that has a discriminatory impact coupled with a discriminatory intent. 3 H After establishing the method of discrimination amongst the cbssitications, the characteristics that distinguish one group from the other must be scrutinized." 9 Different characteristics require diftcrent 3 I. Recent I kvdopments, supt:znote 25, at I 239. 32. .~(·c Evans v. Newton, 3H2 U.S. 296, 30I (I 966) (the sure's transkr of a p;lrk to a priV;lte trustee while the p;lrk was still being mainuined bv the state entangled the state sufticientl\· to meet the state action requirement).
33 39. Sec Unitl'd Sutes v. C:arokne !'rods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, I S3 n.4 ( 1938) (stating that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities mav be a special condition, which tends seriouslv ro curtail the opcr;ltion of those politic1l processes ordinarilv to be relied upon to [201~3 levels of protection, with the degree of protection contingent upon the ability of the class or group to protect itself politically or the biological differences inherent in those characteristics. 40 The classifications arc as f()llows: suspect classifications, quasi-suspect classifications, and all other classifications. A classification based on a suspect classification,41 or ftmdamcntal right, 4 2 requires the application of a strict scrutiny tcst. 43 The courts have articulated that these classifications arc "in most instances irrelevant to anv constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose " 44 and must be "narrowly tailored to ftirthcr a compelling governmental interest. " 45 If a classification is drawn based upon gender, a quasi-suspect class, the method crc<lting the classification is subject to intermediate scrutiny. 46 This requires that an important government interest must exist, and the method of achieving that interest must be substantially related to that intcrcst.4 7 The justification t(x this lower level of scrutiny is that courts have recognized that biological differences exist between the genders that would support sex-based classifications. 4 H All other classifications, such as those based on "age, socioeconomic status, and mental disability arc subject to rational basis review. " 4 <J Rational basis review requires that these non-suspect classifications protect minorities, and which may call t<>r a correspondingly more searching judicial inquin·" and thereby est<lblishing that different classitications need to be <lll(micd diHcTent levels of protection). The public function theory requires that a "function performed I by a public entity be I exclusively and traditionally public" in order to impart state action.61 In K1icgcr v. Tr;wc Compa1~v, the court indicated that a particular board was "entrusted with what has traditionally been a public function: coordinating the educational policy and programs .... " 62 The court articulated that the board W<lS doing more than administering over t:Kulty at a single university and instead was involved in the "implementation of city-wide cduotional policy"-a public fimction.63
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While awarding a scholarship is not a public tlmction, 64 the DREAM fund Commission's other duties, such as "establishing and administering training programs f(Jr high school counselors and counselors, admissions otliccrs, and financial aid officers of public institutions of higher education," arc actions pcrf(mncd by the government or statc.65 While training programs can be private or public tlmctions, the establishing of requirements and standards f(>r public and government employees to participate in specific trainings goes beyond mere public training programs and rises to the level of administration within a state's educational system to become a public function, as in K1icgn: 66 By performing these duties, the Commission steps into the shoes of the statc67 and the administr<ltion of this scholarship becomes action attributable to the state.
In addition to a public function theory, the actions of the Commission could also be considered state action by means of the entanglement thcory. 6 1l By mandating specific methods f(>r scholarship eligibility, 69 In essence, the state is behind the scenes pulling the strings, and when the Commission acts and selects specific groups of people t(>r the schobrship,/ 6 it is <ls though the state is selecting them. Also, under an cntwinement theory, state action will be t(nmd where conduct that is t(>rmally "private" becomes so intertwined with government<ll policies or so impregnated with government character that the conduct becomes subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action .... In deciding the question whether state action existed, the court set out a three fKtor analysis:
This statute presents the three necessary EKtors t(>r cntwinement: state regulation, a close nexus between the state and the action challenged, and encouragement by the state in taking action.
In the case of the Illinois DREAM Act, the state regulates the DREAM fund Commission by requiring that a separate government organization-the Illinois Student Assistance Commission [2013 ("ISAC")-participatc in the scholarship program7X and sets specific guidelines on how the Commission is opcratcd?9 The nexus between the Commission and the state is so close that the members of the Commission arc chosen by the Governor of the state. xo Lastly, the state goes a step beyond encouragement by creating the Commission via statute and charging them with the duties therein. X 1 Ultimately, the state cannot avoid state action, and thereby an equal protection violation, by merely substituting private actors in the state's place. X2 The state attempts to do this through the usc of two separate methods: appointing private actors to operate the CommissionX3 and insisting that the hmds t<>r the scholarship be entirely operated from private donations. X 4 The Supreme Court, however, has stated that when a city "remains entwined in the management or control I of something], it remains subject to the restraints of the fourteenth Amcndmcnt."X5 I Icrc the State is maintaining control of the Commission by establishing guidelines within the Statutc,X6 controlling membership of the Commission,X7
and having another state organization maintain the tlmding. xx Additionally, the state is appointing individuals to the Commission, all t()r the purpose of carrying out the discriminatory policies of the scholarship, satisfying the cntwincmcnt theory, and, again, making policies by means of third parties to circumvent ~md avoid the st~ltc action requirement f()r equal protection analysis.IOO The state's establishment of discriminatory guidelines and selection of trustees to act on its behalf in applying these guidclincsiOI arc the reasons why the courts have articulated the theories of cntanglemcnt 1 02 and cntwincmcnt 10 3 and whv state action should be f(mnd.
Whether state action is f()Und from the Bill's codification or under an alternative theory, sutlicicnt state action exists to give rise to an equal protection analysis. The state's role as puppet-master in the manipulation of this act mandates the application of the federal Constihltion to overcome this injustice. Accordingly, the fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applies.
B. Method o{Discnininztion
Continuing with the equal protection analysis, after state action has been met, the application or method that creates the discriminatory policy must be addrcsscd. 1 04 Here the statute bcially creates the classification advancing the equal protection analysis. 1 os However, if the statute were f(mnd to be t:Kially neutral, it would still be discriminatory in its effect because of its intent and results.
A classification is deemed to be bcially discriminatory when the discrimination can be t(nmd in the plain language of the statutc. 106 In the Act bctc)rc us, one of the requirements is that a recipient must "have at least one parent who immigrated to the U nitcd States." I 07 The groups created arc a class of children who have one parent that immigrated to the United States and a class of children whose parents did not immigrate to the U nitcd States, I Oil classification in the bnguagc of the Bill. Therefore, the statute will be deemed bcially discriminatory t<>r purposes of an equal protection analvsis. 1 09 Should a f:1eially discriminatory argument be unsuccessful and the statute t(nmd bcially neutral, the equal protection analysis is still proper under a discriminatory application thcory.ll o The Commission is required by law to select individuals t<>r scholarships based on the given criteri~1 of the statute. Ill By carrying out its duties, the Commission will only be able to award the scholarship to those who have at least one parent that immigrated to the United States. 112 This would have the same dlcct and outcome as the f1eiallv discrimin~ltory argument, again, advancing the equal protection an~1lvsis.
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In the event that neither of these theories is succcsstlli, a third theory exists where the statute is bcially neutral and neutrally applied but produces discriminatory results coupled with a discrimin~1tory intcnt.ll4 Proving this theory requires the same scenario used under the previous theory, in which there arc discriminatory results t(>r the recipients of the scholarship, but not because of the selection process. If these results occur, looking at the legislative debate bd(>rc the Act was passed can satisfy the discriminatory intent prong. 11 S Senator Culkrton, who sponsored ~md submitted the bill, 116 indicated that the intent of the Bill was to make available to non-citizcn individuals "the same programs that the citizens can avail themselves of right nmv,"ll7 suggesting that the t(>Cus of this Bill was to aid non-citizcn individuals. Additionally, Senator Johnson emphasized the purpose of the Bill as being for "childrcn of immigr~mts who came here 109. .~(·c 1d 947/67(c) (creating other classifications; however, f(>r the purposes of this Note, Subsection (c)(4) is the relevant dassitiution 126. I 10 ILL. COM!'. STAT. 947/67(c) (201 I) (I(>Cusing on the citizcnship implications associcltcd with the statute\ usc of the word immigrants).
Alienage
The way the statute is phrased, stating that that the scholarship is eligible for people who have a "parent who immigrated to the United States,"
12~'~ draws a divide based on alienage.I2<J Black's Lnv Dictionary defines alietuge as "the condition or state of an alien ""' 0 ~md an alien as "a foreigner; one born abroad; a person resident in one country, but owing allegiance to another." 1 -' 1 Additionally, federal legislation has articulated a statutory ddinition of an alien as '\1ny person not a citizen or national of the United St~ltes." I -'2 These ddinitions articulate the characteristics necessary fiJr a classification b~1sed on alienage. for this Act, the parent of the individual must have been an ~1lien (someone born abroad) who came to the United States'-'-' in order for the individual to be eligible to receive the scholarship.I34
Looking at the floor debates results in the same interpretation f(x the purposes of articulating the basis of the classification as being grounded along alienage lines. Throughout the tloor debates, in both the Illinois House of Representatives and the Illinois Senate, it w~ls repeated and emphasized that the Act was going to aid the children of illegal immigr~mts and to give undocumented children a chance to further their educations by making funding available to allow them to attend higher education bcilities. 1 35 These expressions indicate that the intention of the Act is to create a classification between citizens and non-citizens or, put into the equ~1l protection fr~m1ework, a classification based on alienagc.I36 process of democratic self-govcrnmcnt."l4° furthermore, alienage classifications preventing aliens from receiving in-state tuition luvc bcm struck down in the past. ISO While the Supreme Court has stated that "undocumented aliens" arc not themselves a suspect classification, 1 S 1 the wording of the Act allows t(>r documented and undocumented aliens to receive this scholarship, 152 thus preventing that tl·om affecting the classifiotion or which test to apply.
!d. (requiring parents' immigration creates anation:ll origin requirement

Nationzl origin
In the alternative, the Act also classifies applicants along lines of national origin. N a tiona) origin classifications, instead of t<xusing on citizenship status like alimagc, 153 f(Kus on "the country from which you or your f(>rcbc~lrs came. "1 54 Classifications "I distinguishing I between citizens solely because of their ancestry I is I odious to a free people whose institutions arc t(mndcd upon the doctrine of equality, "1 ss and the Act classifies directly along those lines.
The Illinois DREAM Act's language requiring tlut ~m individual "have a parent who immigrated to the United Statcs"l5 6 expressly inquires into one's ancestry to determine if one meets this requirement ~md is therd(HT eligible f(>r this scholarship.lS7 This type of inquiry and classification of individuals "implicates the s~m1C grave concerns as a classification specifying a particular race by name. "ISS 140. .~l.·c id. ,\t 216 ("iTihe standard of review is lowered when evaluating the validirv of exclusions that entrust only to citizens important elective and non-elective positions whose operations go to the heart of representative government.").
ISO. [2013 This has the effect of using the national origin of one's parents to determine one's eligibility. If both parents' national origin is that of the United States, the individual is not eligible f(Jr the scholarship. 15 <J An unpublished federal case from the District Court of New Jersey addressed the national origin relationship by stating that the national origin of an individual "born in the United States is determined by looking only to his anccstry." 1 60 This articulation dispels the possibility of the state contending that the Act is not a national origin case by arguing that the Act docs not address the individual's national origin, but instead f(>euscs on parcntagc.I 6 1 Even if such an argument is accepted, the parentage here only applies because the applicant is looking to his parent's national origin; it docs not f(>eus on his relationship to his parcnts.I62 This creates a chain where, even if the classification is drawn along parentage lines, the ultimate classification still rests on the national origin roots of the parents. To allow the state to overcome a national ongm classitlcation by simply removing the classification by a matter of generations, or degree of separation, would permit classifications based on one's race to be enf()rccablc as long as states phrase legislation to depend on one's past generations, 16 3 which again, the courts have not allowed. 1M
The most important case in establishing an equal protection analysis f()r a classification based on national origin is Korcmatm v. United Statcs. 165 In Korcmatm, a curfew-relocation order was enacted t()r people of Japanese ancestry, barring them from leaving their houses during certain hours, much as the Illinois DREAM Act is a scholarship-eligibility bar against those whose ancestry docs not 
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f2013 rectified by legislative means, these laws arc subject to strict scrutiny ... _17 3 As such, strict scrutiny requires a compelling government interest f(:>r the classification, and the implementation of the classification must be narrowly tailored to meet th~lt intcrcst.I74
Aside from the justification of the view set f(xth in the Ci~v oF Cleburne, Texas, the Court has stated that alienage, race, and national origin should further be protected because, in addition to not being reflective of their "ability to contribute to socicty," 17 S these classifications arc "characteristic! s I determined by causes not within the control of the 1 individual! .... "!76 furthermore, the Constitution will not allow these classifications, either, which is why the Act must be struck down under equal protection f(>r punishing children based on characteristics of their parcnts. 1 77 While this statute may appear to be "beneficial" discrimination by aiding minorities, the Supreme Court has already addressed this theory.' n Ultimately it has been decided that It !he Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm hvorcd races or arc based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race rclev~1nt to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us <111. 179
Therd()re, strict scrutiny applies regardless of how beneficial this discriminatory statute is considcrcd.l80 The Courts have, however, recently articulated that the majority party would not pass legislation to their own detriment unless they deemed it satisf:Ktory. 181 This argument bils to take into consideration other reasons that may exist f(>r passing legislation, such as pandering to certain groups f(>r votcs. 1 ~2 While strict scrutiny has been rdcrrcd to as "strict in thcorv, but htal in hct,"i~3 an ,111:1lysis of the test must still be done to determine if the state has a compelling interest that is narrowh· tailorcd. 1 ~' 4
Compci!Iizg IiltLTcst
The state docs not have a compelling interest in establishing the DREAM schobrship program b,1scd on a suspect classification. The otlcrcd intent of the act is to "help I the applicants' I f1milics and maybe be the first person that's gone to colkgc."IX5 few compelling interests exist to justif)r legislation that utilizes suspect classifications.' X6 That said, courts have recognized compelling interests in the past: I ~' 7 first, to remedy past discrimination lXX and second, to provide a diversity of perspectives within cducation. 1 X 0 Unf(>rtunatdy, neither of these interests is prcscnt within this Act.
While this statute creates a scholarship f(>r students to aid them in funding their education, ' 00 merely being related to education docs not make the Act sufficient to meet the compelling interest of [2013 in its law schooi. 1 lJ2 Unlike GruttcJ~ this Act docs not ~1ssurc diversity in an educational institution. The applicants could go to a school that is already diverse or not provide diversity at all, as eligibility is based on the parents' and not the applicant's status. furthermore, ~1nd most importantly, "race and national origin I can be considered I, but . . . cannot I be used to I . . . render a judgment solely on that basis," as is the case here, leaving the Act without a compelling intercst.19 3
Aside from diversity at an educational instih1tion, the Court has f(mnd programs that rectify past discrimination against suspect classes to be a compelling interest. 194 Illinois State Representative Eddie Acevedo stated, "This is going to be a ftmd that's going to be available not only to undocumented immigrants but to all immigrants here in Illinois." 195 However, there is no evidence that this segment of the population has been discriminated against in tlmding. 196 In f:1ct, some of the senators and representatives themselves may potentially be eligible f(>r the scholarship, having immigrant parents. 197 Thercf(>re, a scenario of discrimination against immigrant populations must have existed in Illinois in order to pass legislation to remedy that past discrimination.19X
Additionally, while the Court in I<orcmatsu did find th~lt a compelling interest existed in detaining those with Japanese ancestry, the interest was predicated on the bet that the United States was at war with Japan, 1 <J<J and there arc presently no wars against immigrants to justif~· such a classification.200 ~urthcrmorc, Congress decided that "the decision in Korcmatm lies overruled in the court of history,"201 significantly limiting the weight a compelling interest stemming from I<orcmatm could be given.
Narrowk tailored
The Supreme Court requires that suspect cbssifications with a compelling interest must be narrowly tailored in order to limit the effects of the discrimination. 202 Thcrd(:n-e, even should a compelling state interest be f(nmd in the case of the Illinois DREAM Act, the statute as written is not n~1rrowly tailored to meet such an interest. If the interest is grounded in making education more avaibble to citizens who would otherwise be unable to attend college, it f1ils to do so in a narrowly tailored manner, as the statute's wording allows individuals who sutter no financial hardships or burdens to apply f(>r the schobrship. 2m Allowing wealthy students or those with college expenses paid through other means to take advantage of the schobrship may deprive those whose only prohibition is cost of a scholarship opportunity. 204 ~urthermorc, economic h~1rdships do not distinguish based on national origin, race, or alienage. These hardships atHict all segments of the population, and if the state's interest W~lS to make education more aft(n·dabJc to its citizens, nonfinancial-based classifications curtail that goal. 20 5 Instead, the Act is At the same time, the Act is also overly broad, providing superfluous assistance to some individuals ~1nd not others who arc similarly situatcd. 2 07 Prior to the statute, the state already had financial aid assistance programs in place t()r citizens, as well as reduced tuition rates at public universities to make college more aft(H·dable.20X following the public act creating this statute, those same assistance programs were made available to immigrant students who tiled t()r a taxpayer identification numbcr. 20 ' > By allowing everyone within the state regardless of alienage or national origin access to the same financial assistance t()r higher education, the state was not and is not creating any classification. It is the portion of the Act mandating that a scholarship be payable to certain individuals distinguishable on the basis of national origin and alienage that creates the problem. Thus, opening tlmding puts everyone on equal f()oting, rendering creation of the scholarship a separate and unnecessary action not narrowly tailored to the compelling interest.
If the state is successful in articulating that the interest it purports to establish is fcmnd in educational divcrsity2IO even though the state is not an educational institution,211 the Act would still likely not be narrowly tailored. first, the Act docs not require applicants to attend universities with an underrepresented group of students whose parents arc immigrants; thus, there is no assurance of crc~lting the diverse arrav of views in which the state takes an intcrcst. 212 Nor is the state in the best position to create diverse educational settings, ~1s universities determine admissions and arc most knowledgeable ~1bout the diversity of their student bodies. Additionally, the same day Gruttcr was decided to allow educational diversity as a compelling interest, the Court ruled on the attempt in Grat:z v. Bollingcr to apply that interest. 213 In G1:zt:z, the interest was deemed to not be narrowly tailored because the admissions program gave so much weight to race that it became the deciding bctor in admitting studcnts.214 The ditlcrcncc between Gl:zt:z and Gruttcr as the Court articulated it is that seeking to achieve diversity in the educational setting is tine, but race cannot overshadow other qualifications. 215 Like in Gnzt:z, the Illinois DREAM Act uses a suspect classification as the determining hctor f(>r eligibility and hils to be narrowly tailored to achieve any alleged diversity goal. furthermore, in (,'ruttCI; the Court emphasized the need to treat people as individuals21 6 and not just as members of groups.217 While this Act purports to be selecting individual applicants, it docs so only after preventing other groups from applying, again making it br from narrowly tailored. 21 X Likewise, the Act will not succeed in an argument of remedying past discrimination. The Act is <>Vcr-inclusivc, allowing children who arc immigr~lnts thcmsclvcs, 21 'J undocumented alicns, 220 and United States citizens to apply, 2 21 while also leaving open the possibility f(>r any one of these to be ultimately incligible.222 Thcrd(>rc, the statute c1nnot be narrowly tailored in remedying past discrimination when r2o13 members of the group f(mncrly discriminated against arc both included and potentially excluded at the same time under the application of the remedying law.223
IV. CONCLUSION
As identified in this Note, to establish a viobtion of the Equal Protection Clause, the first requirement is that some fcm11 of "state action" exists. 2 24 Illinois' Public Act 097-0233 is by definition and in its nature an Act passed by the process of bicameralism and presentment and, thcrdc:>rc, constitutes "state action. " 225 The Illinois Scmte proposed and approved Senate Bill 2185, 226 the Illinois House of Representatives approved the bill, 22 7 and the Governor of Illinois signed it into law. 22 X These acts-proposing, approving, enacting, and eventually enforcing-<lrc direct actions taken by the state and thus "state action" f(>r purposes of an equal protection analysis.
The state meets the second requirement by creating a classification by drawing distinctions along class lines in the wording of the statute. The classification created is one established under alienage or national origin,229 which arc suspect classifications requiring the application of the strict scrutiny test. 2 3° The stahltc, E1lling short of meeting a compelling state interest or being narrowly tailored to achieve any such interest if one did exist, E1ils the strict scrutinv test. 231 223. ld (noting thar bcc1usc the Acr docs not address rhc individual .1pplving, similar pcopk in similar .situations will be treated ditkrcntlv based on their parents' statuses).
224. "discriminate on the basis of race" to achieve a "worthy goal." 2 "" The statute draws from "immutable characteristics determined solclv hv the accident of birth " 2 3 4 -charactcristics beyond personal contn;l. 1;1 bet, the Supreme Court in P{vlcr v. Doc articulated the exact sittution this Act creates: "children who arc plaintitls in these cases 'can atkct neither their parents' conduct nor their own st~ltus."' 2
35
The children eligible f(ll· the DREAM Act scholarship arc just like the children ineligible f(>r this scholarship; to treat them ditlcrcntly docs them an injustice bcf(m: their journey into higher education even begins. Public Act 97-233 needs to be repealed bd(>l-c it is t(nmd unconstitutional f(>r violating the fourteenth Amendment. Allowing it to continue wastes resources as well as time of both the state and the individual applicants whose ctl<>rts will be f(>r naught once the statute is deemed unconstitutional. 23 6 The Illinois DREAM Act has implications outside of Illinois and the United States Constitution, too. When legislative acts like this arc executed on unstable f(nmdations, they give Elise hope and security to the people who rely on thcm.237 Student applicants, who arc potentially undocumented immigrants, run the severe risk of being ousted after revealing their alien status, feeling that programs like this arc aimed to help thcm.23X While it may be true that such laws arc being created to aid undocumented students, their legal sutuscs cannot be modified or changed by the state, 239 as adjustment of legal the more moncv it will spend on it, in addition to whcltevcr mew happen to the recipients when this is deemed unconstitutional). [2013 status requires federal action. 240 Thus, state programs arc creating potentially troubling situations2 41 with little to gain when the programs arc based on unconstitutional grounds.
Other states already implementing or considering simibr legislation 242 should consider this analysis, as it may also apply to their acts. Given the importance of these bills to the individuals being assisted, ensuring their constitutionality and ability to be upheld is of the utmost importance. 243 One individual is believed to have taken his lite because he believed he could no longer pursue his dream after a version of the federal DREAM Act E1iled to pass.244 While state acts serve significantly diflercnt goals than the proposed federal Act and the previous example is likely extreme, the emotions that surround the state bills arc still very important to potentially affected individuals. 245 Illinois and any state considering this type of legislation should remedy constitutional violations prior to giving t:1lsc hope or awarding monies to individuals. This will prevent other individuals from experiencing similar letdowns and tragedy when such acts arc t<:mnd unconstitutionaJ. 246 This Act's fatal flaw is the state's participation; without that participation, the Act is not subject to an equal protection analysis. 247 The Illinois legislators adamant about aiding the sihlation of immigrant and undocumented children alikc24X have taken the first step by making already-existing higher education tlmding available to all Illinois citizens. 24<J The scholarship portion of the Act-the only portion violating equal protection-should be severed from the Act, and the same legislators should f(mn a private organization, privately run and privately funded, to provide DREAM scholarships. Giwn that the existing scholarship is alrc1dy "privately funded,"2SO the org~mization would be in the same position for ~lLqmnng contributions, and, because the organization would be priv,ltc, it could be established in a relatively short period of time. 2 51
Additiotully, state universities ~1re in a better position to administer scholarships to undocumented or immigrant children. The interests laid out in Gruttcr establish that a university "has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body," and thcrd(>re is the proper ~wemte to implement such scholarships.25 2 While a university cannot implement the same program as the one enacted by the st~ue, it can begin taking into consideration undocumented or immigrant statuses of individuals and potenti~1lly otkr these students scholarships to entice them to come to a particular university in order to encourage diverse viewpoints in the educational setting. 25" By enacting progr~1ms that aft(>rd assistance to immigLmt and undocumented students, the state is providing a positive message on how the state sees and values such individuals. 254 Hovvevcr, enacting unconstitutional legislation to tltrther that view serves no one, no matter how strong the desire to promote it. The portion of this Act that puts cvc1:vonc in the state on equal f(>oting is a commendable eH<>rt, and the state should not let that progress be overshadowed by the unconstitutional portions of the Act. Instead, Public Act 97-233,
